Antecedents of war: the geopolitics of low oil prices and decelerating financial liquidity by Hany, Mohamed
Antecedents of War:
The geopolitics of low oil prices and
decelerating financial liquidity
Hany Abdel-Latifa,c,∗, Mahmoud El-Gamalb,c
aSwansea University, UK
bRice University, USA
cEconomic Research Forum
Abstract
We investigate the joint dynamics of oil prices, financial liquidity and geopoliti-
cal risk, within a multi-country global vector-autoregressive (GVAR) model. We
find that low oil prices are expected to trigger higher levels of geopolitical risk,
and that decelerating financial liquidity serves as an accelerator.
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1. Introduction
Oil prices plunged from a peak of $115 per barrel in June 2014 to under $35
at the end of February 2016. Although similar drops were observed in the past
(mid 1980s and 2008-09), this time is different because it may usher the end
of petrodollars. The link between global financial liquidity and oil prices has5
been studied extensively (Jo, 2014, for example). However, recent studies, such
as Alsalman (2016), have suggested that the previously strong link between
financial and oil market bubbles broke down in the 2000s. Ratti and Vespignani
(2013) found evidence of the reverse causal link: unanticipated increases in
global liquidity can lead to statistically significant increases in real oil prices.10
We contribute to this literature by including geopolitical risk as a third factor
in the multivariate analysis of oil prices and global financial liquidity. There is a
growing literature investigating the causal direction from intensified geopoliti-
cal risk to oil prices, although Blomberg et al. (2009) found that declining market15
power of OPEC has reduced the magnitudes of geopolitical risk premia in oil
prices. Lee (2016) argued that major oil producers, especially in the Middle East,
remain particularly attractive targets for terrorists, because significant economic
harm can result from a major disruption of oil production and/or transport
from the region. Noguera-Santaella (2016) found a strong positive effect of20
geopolitical strife on oil prices.
We add to this literature by using a continuous measure of geopolitical risk,
and studying its joint causal links with oil prices and global financial liquidity
(through petrodollar recycling and its reversal). To the best of our knowledge,25
this is the first paper to consider all three global variables simultaneously. The
self perpetuating cycle for all three variables was studied in El-Gamal and Jaffe
(2009), who noted the joint roles of geopolitics and financial liquidity in oil price
surges in 1973, 1979, and 2003, and the reverse causal link from low oil prices to
geopolitical risk in 1990 and 2001.30
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses data
and empirical methodology, Section 3 summarizes our empirical results, and
Section 4 provides some brief concluding remarks.
2. Methodology and Dataset35
We employ a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model, which allows
us to study the dynamic relationships amongst oil prices, financial liquidity,
and geopolitical risks in a multi-country framework. The model allows for
multivariate transmission and feedback at country and global levels. The GVAR
model can be presented as follows:
xit =
pi∑
l=1
Φilxi,t−l +
qi∑
l=1
Ailx
∗
i,t−l + it, (1)
for country i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N and time period t = 1, 2, ..., T , where Φil and Ail
are matrices of unknown parameters, and it are uncorrelated idiosyncratic
shocks. The GVAR model incorporates two sets of lagged variables: domestic
variables x and foreign variables x∗, where pi and qi are the lag orders for
country i. Foreign variables are assumed to be weakly exogenous, and include
country-specific foreign variables as well as global variables. Country-specific
foreign variables are cross-sectional averages of the domestic variables in other
countries. We use bilateral trade-based weights wij for this purpose:
x∗it =
N∑
j=0
wijxjt (2)
Our global variables include oil prices, geopolitical risk index, and global
financial liquidity. These variables are assumed endogenous only in the US-
country model, and weakly exogenous for all other countries, which can only
influence the variables collectively. The model is estimated on a country-by-
country basis, and parameter estimates are stacked, based on a weight matrix,40
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into a single global model, which can be used to stimulate different shocks in
the system, c.f. Dovern and Huber (2015) for details.
We use quarterly data from 1979Q1 to2017Q2 for 70 countries. Domestic
variables include real GDP, investment (measured as gross capital formation),45
and international reserves. The bulk of this data is obtained through DataStream,
while bilateral trade data are obtained from the IMF direction of trade statistics
(DOTS) database. We use Brent price of crude oil (in USD per Barrel) for oil
price, and the BIS series (Bank for International Settlements, March 2017) on
credit from all sectors to the private non-financial sector as our measure of50
global financial liquidity. For our measure of global geopolitical risk, we use the
index constructed by Caldara and Iacoviello (2016).
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Diagnostic Tests
Using the ADF unit root test, we found individual series to be integrated of55
order one. Therefore, we proceed to estimate a set of country-specific vector
error correction (VECX) models, with ‘X’ denoting weakly exogenous foreign
variables. To test for the presence of cointegration, we used the maximum
eigenvalue and trace statistics at the 5% significance level, and cocluded that
all estimated country-specific models have either one or two cointegrating re-60
lationships. In addition, according to the F-statistics tests of residuals’ serial
correlation in individual country VECMX models, we failed to reject the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 5% significance level.
We also confirmed the weak exogeneity assumption of foreign variables by65
failing to reject the significance of estimated error-correction terms in auxiliary
regressions, wherein foreign and global variables were dependent variables.
Finally, using the persistence profiles, we were able to confirm the validity of
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our estimated cointegrating vectors by illustrating fast convergence to long term
relationships, c.f. (Pesaran and Shin, 1996)1.70
3.2. Dynamic Analysis
Results are shown graphically in terms of generalised impulse response
functions (GRIFs) from our estimated GVAR(2) model. We consider shocks to
each of our three global variables (oil price, financial liquidity, and geopolitical
risks) and track the response of the other two variables. We plot the median75
GIRF and its 95% confidence interval from 2000 bootstrap replications.
The pair of GIRF graphs for the impacts on global liquidity and geopolitical
risk from a one standard deviation negative shock in oil prices are shown in
Fig. 1. The left panel shows that, starting one year after the shock, geopolitical80
risk increases significantly, around 4%, and persists in response to a one s.d.
negative oil price shocks. This indicates that periods of low oil prices contribute
to increased geopolitical strife. The right panel shows that global liquidity
declines significantly (in the order of 10%), both immediately and persistently,
in response to a one s.d. negative oil price shock. This indicates that a decline85
in oil prices reduces or reverses petrodollar flows to the international financial
system, thus resulting in reduced global financial liquidity.
1Detailed test results are omitted for space considerations but available upon request.
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Figure 1: Impulse = One s.d. Negative Shock to Oil Price
Geopolitical Risk GIRF Global Liquidity GIRF
The pair of GIRFs for the impacts on global liquidity and oil prices from a
one standard deviation positive shock in global geopolitical risk are shown in
Fig. 2. The left panel shows a persistently negative (approximately 0.2%) but90
statistically insignificant decline in global liquidity. The right panel shows a
persistently positive (approximately 1.5%) and statistically significant response
of oil prices to a one s.d. positive shock in geopolitical risk. This accords
with our hypothesis on oil price and geopolitical risk cycles: lower oil prices
trigger higher geopolitical risk (as we have seen in the left panel of 1), and the95
latter leads to later increases in oil prices, perpetuating the endogenous cycle
discussed in El-Gamal and Jaffe (2009).
Figure 2: Impulse = One s.d. Positive Shock to Geopolitical Risk Index
Global Liquidity GIRF Oil Price GIRF
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The pair of GIRFs for the impacts on geopolitical risk and oil prices from a
one s.d. negative shock in global financial liquidity are shown in Fig. 3. The left
panel shows that geopolitical risk index responds positively and persistently100
(at approximately 2.5%), albeit mostly statistically insignificantly, to the neg-
ative liquidity shock. The right panel shows that oil prices are likely to drop
persistently (by approximately 5%) in response to the negative shock in global fi-
nancial liquidity. The impulse response in oil prices is statistically significant for
approximately 3 years, during which it appears that the investment-commodity-105
class and/or speculative-trade channel from global financial liquidity to oil
prices is hampered by the stipulated negative liquidity shock.
Figure 3: Impulse = One s.d. Negative Shock to Global Financial Liquidity
Geopolitical Risk GIRF Oil Price GIRF
Finally, inspired by our earlier findings, we consider the impacts of likely
combined shocks of two global variables on the third. In particular, we examine
the effect of a simultaneous negative shock to global financial liquidity and110
heightened geopolitical risk as well as the impact of a simultaneous negative
shock to financial liquidity and oil prices. The sobering conclusion of the GIRF
analysis to individual and simultaneous shocks that resemble the current envi-
ronment is that we should expect continuation of the current forecast of low oil
prices, decelerating or declining financial liquidity, and medium-level height-115
ening of geopolitical risk. Of course, were a major shock to geopolitical risk
to materialize, it may have a strong positive effect on oil prices and financial
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liquidity, through the petrodollar recycling channel. Ominously, if oil prices
were to drop significantly from their current levels, this may trigger that surge
in geopolitical risk, which may plant the seeds for higher oil prices in a later120
period. In the meantime, a major financial liquidity shock due to significant
monetary tightening, either pre-emptively to enhance monetary policy effec-
tiveness during the next global recession, or in response to a potential up-tick
in inflation, is unlikely to have a significant effect on geopolitical risk and oil
prices. In this regard, financial liquidity merely serves as a pro-cyclical accel-125
erator for oil price movements during periods of high prices (e.g. during the
decade 2003–2013), as well as low prices (e.g. in the current period), through
the commodity-investment-class and/or speculative trading channels.
Figure 4: Global Variable Responses to Select Combined Shocks
Oil Price GIRF (simultaneous 1 s.d. each:
(i) negative shock to financial liquidity, and
(ii) positive shock to geopolitical risk)
Geopolitical Risk GIRF (simultaneous 1 s.d.
each:
(i) negative shock to financial liquidity, and
(ii) negative shock to oil prices)
4. Conclusion
Our GVAR model took the U.S. to be the only country that can unilaterally130
influence the three global variables (oil prices, financial liquidity, and geopo-
litical risk), while the large number of countries in our sample were allowed
collectively to influence those variables. Generalized impulse response func-
tions from the GVAR model confirm our hypothesis that a negative shock to
oil prices results in higher geopolitical risk and lower global financial liquidity,135
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as petrodollar recycling decelerates or reverses direction. The GIRFs also show
that a positive shock to geopolitical risk results in higher oil prices. Thus, we
reconfirm the perpetuation of the cycle of low oil prices (e.g. in the late 1980s)
leading to geopolitical strife (e.g. first Iraq War), which, in turn, leads to higher
oil prices. We also confirm the catalytic role of financial liquidity in accelerating140
oil price bubbles and crashes, as petrodollar recycling fuels speculative demand
for all commodities, including oil.
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